

DRAFT REPORT-NOT FOR CITATION

Mapping of Official Development Assistance and Donor Profile in the field of conflict and governance-2006

**Report commissioned by
Conflict and Governance Facility
(CAGE)**



A partnership project of the European Union and National Treasury, South Africa



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report, commissioned by the Conflict and Governance Facility (CAGE), a partnership project of National Treasury and the European Union, seeks to provide the framework for reviewing and updating the ODA/Donor Profile of partners involved in the fields of conflict and governance¹.

A key outcome of this process is to guide a way forward for the donors to ensure optimum use of ODA. Central to this review is the place of development agents (government, donors, research institutions and civil society) as mechanisms for enriching and adding value to the conflict (prevention, management etc) and governance sector. To this end, the report suggests a better informed and co-ordinated donor approach based on comparative advantage and greater synergy with South Africa's ODA framework. An important link is the placement of mechanisms similar to CAGE in a better position to facilitate more efficient use of ODA.

To further optimise ODA 'take up', recommendations include areas for consideration by donors and South African policy makers. **Section 8. Towards a Way Forward: Conclusions and Recommendations:** points to more functional coordination amongst donors (synergy based on comparative advantage); sectoral audits and evaluations (improved programme targeting); a need for ODA impact assessments; human and state security issues (domestic and regional remit); improved ODA management (human resource and systems management capability); and mainstreaming Civil Society in programme implementation processes (conflict prone communities and community based organisations – CBO's). The overriding challenge however, still remains one of optimising the application of ODA inflows to achieve sustained outcomes in Southern Africa.

Donors offer support through a variety of forms (grants, technical co-operation and financial co-operation). There is Official Development Assistance (ODA) which is the official resource flow from the international donor community to South Africa as well as direct support to civil society, outside the formal government-to-government development co-operation framework.²

This report builds therefore upon issues raised in the course of a Conflict and Governance Facility (CAGE) donor/ODA mapping exercise in the arena in which the Facility functions. Respondents were drawn from the National Treasury – International Development Cooperation Department, donor

¹ This report seeks to update the report commissioned and disseminated by the Conflict and Governance Facility entitled "Report on Development Assistance support in terms of peace, security, conflict and governance arena-2005" See www.cage.org.za

²Policy framework and procedural guidelines for the management of Official Development Assistance (ODA): First Edition: October 2003: International Development Co-operation, National Treasury of South Africa

institutions, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and Civil Society.

ODA, under South Africa's Medium Term Economic Framework (METF), aims to be strategically focused, in line with South Africa's policy position and also that of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). To this end, a mapping exercise was undertaken in the conflict and governance sector as one of the possible points of departure for a more co-ordinated sectoral approach to enhance the 'trickle down' effect; increase effective impact and promote sustainable socio-economic development.

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1. Introduction:

This paper restricts itself to a brief overview of conflict and governance activities supported by international donors in South and Southern Africa. To this end, CAGE, through both a workshop and structured questionnaire attempts to map 'who does what' in the sector. The workshop proceedings and ODA Donor Matrix feed into the overall sectoral analysis³.

The aim of this review is to contribute to the body of existing sectoral knowledge and make practical recommendations for the future application of ODA/donor support. Suggestions are two-fold: more sustainable benefits and utility derived through the efficient ODA/donor deployment and targeting; and the enhancement of strategic ODA inputs in the conflict and governance sector. First however, a short background on the EU – South Africa partnership that produced CAGE.

2. Background:

The Conflict and Governance Facility (CAGE) is the result of a Financing Agreement between the South African Government and the European Commission (EC); and highlights one of the chosen priority areas (Governance and Democracy) indicated in the Country Strategy Paper and Multi-annual Indicative Programme (CSP/MIP).

Identified projects such as CAGE reflect the South African Government's priority needs that are taken up by the European Programme for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD) and which provides the operational framework. The CAGE Facility operates under the overall agreement **SA/73200-02/02** and Financing Agreement (FA) **Project No: SA/1011/000** between the South African Government and the European Commission (EC).

CAGE was set up with the following objective, purpose and results:

Overall objective

To improve national policy, decision-making and implementation on issues related to foreign and domestic policy that either mitigate or cause conflict, thus contributing to good governance and the deepening of democracy in South and Southern Africa.

Purpose

To promote informed decisions on issues related to conflict and governance, based on research and studies through the participation of research and other appropriate organisations.

³ Section 7 p. 15: Analysis of the Information

Results

1. Improved policy analysis as a basis for better informed policy making and implementation
2. Capacity of research institutions strengthened: incentives for joint research between established and emerging institutions, thereby promoting transfer of knowledge and skills.
3. Policy debate strengthened. Participation in policy debate is enlarged. Quality of discussions and dialogue enriched.

Based on this broad mandate, CAGE undertook this mapping exercise which includes the objective of charting the current distribution of ODA inflows within **the conflict and governance sector**. A logical adjunct is how to promote optimum and co-ordinated use of inflows with the ODA framework. The Terms of Reference (ToR) and ODA coordination workshop provide opportunities for data gathering to map the sector. Details of the workshop process and methodology are summarised in Section 3, below.

3. The Workshop Process and methodology

The workshop was conducted in one day with the intention of it providing but one means of data collection. Although an indicative number of 120 people were invited from the ODA/donor community, a small number of participants attended, with representation from the International Development Co-operation of National Treasury, the Donor Community including the EU and Civil Society Organisations (CSO's)⁴.

Ms. Charmaine Estment (Programme Co-ordinator – CAGE) welcomed participants who introduced themselves thereafter.

As CAGE is a partnership agreement between National Treasury and the European Union, it was important to have leading inputs from representatives of the two organisations.

Mr. Luyanda Yaso (Senior Analyst/Director International Development Cooperation – National Treasury) gave a PowerPoint presentation on South Africa's Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy and Co-ordination.

Ms Jozet Müller, the Project Officer-Political Co-operation at the Delegation of the European Union in SA, provided a brief input with regard to the financing of CAGE within the context of bilateral EU-South Africa relations.

The workshop facilitator, Mr. Toks George-Coker set the tone of the workshop by localising CAGE's core activities in the context of workshop outputs and the conflict and governance arena and inviting further inputs from participants.

⁴ See Annex 1 for Participants List and Annex 2 for List of Invited Organisations: The low uptake was cited as a result of a number of clashing commitments and end of year diary pressures

Electronic/verbal presentations by participants followed, highlighting their focal areas of sectoral activity and identifying implementation approaches.

During a facilitated question and answer session, participants discussed a number of issues. Views were aired on human resources employed in the sector, capacity building, funding deficiencies, academic initiatives, obstacles to programme implementation, existence of grassroots initiatives and regional (AU), and sub-regional (SADC) issues. Suggestions for updating and expanding on information gaps from the 2005 Report (see footnote 1) Workshop also featured⁵.

The discussions tended to focus on the traditional conflict issues (peace and security), as opposed to moving to a meta level of ODA/donor support of these. However, discussions were nevertheless participatory, providing an opportunity for meaningful deliberations.

To supplement the workshop, a donor mini- survey was conducted through a questionnaire, telephone/personal interviews and information supplied, used to update the ODA matrix. Noticeable however, was the difficulty in obtaining information from sectoral actors unable to attend the workshop proper. This is mentioned in **Section 8. Towards a Way Forward: Conclusions and Recommendations.**

⁵ See Section 6.3. p.15. Matrix of Support

The next section details the Structure of the Report.

4. Structure of the Report:

This report is structured in the following way:

Section 5: Key Issues arising from the discussions around broad-based policy and capacity-building needs

Section 6: Mapping of support within the conflict, security, peace-building and governance sector: This matrix is based on information from the workshop and subsequent follow ups with partners who were not present.

Section 7: Analysis of the Information

Section 8: Towards a Way Forward: Conclusions and Recommendations

Annexure

The next section covers points discussed during the workshop under two headings: Broad-based policy; and Capacity Building.

5. Key Issues arising from the discussions:

5.1 Broad-based policy:

Management of Official Development Assistance (ODA): Mr. Luyanda Yaso (NT - IDC) indicated that SA's ODA policies and procedures will be reviewed and updated periodically, in line with the Paris Declaration and certainly by the 2008 OECD-DAC meeting in Ghana⁶. Highlights of the IDC presentation are summarised below:

- ODA is co-ordinated by South Africa under a decentralised management framework.
- ODA-supported interventions must be sustained beyond donor support and contribute to mutually beneficial and sustainable partnerships.
- South Africa has “unique” ODA characteristics accounting for approximately 1% of the country's budget. This is mostly grants and Technical Assistance (TA) and represents a budget supplement.
- South Africa must influence reform locally; at policy, strategy and aid delivery levels
- Developmental challenges (primarily poverty & inequality, including HIV/AIDS) must be addressed in a sustainable manner (politically, economically, socially and environmentally).
- Lessons learnt must be taken forward with reference to regional/African development co-operation and the global ODA debate.

Questions on the efficacy of ODA support, given identified bottlenecks faced by respondents in executing their mandates, were also tabled, as follows:

⁶ Participants received the “Policy framework and procedural guidelines for the management of Official Development Assistance (ODA)”: First Edition: October 2003: International Development Co-operation, National Treasury of South Africa from CAGE.

- The EU strategy for Africa (Contonou) informs its continental activity yet EU relations with South Africa are governed by the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement. This creates gaps/disjuncture in the conflict and governance approach –continental vs. national-more research is needed to harmonise SA's position;
- The Country Strategy Paper for South Africa from 2008 onwards is an innovation in that it is now a Joint Country Strategy Paper including the EU and some Members States-what implications?
- The question of how formal government structure (policy) is reflected in practice (implementation) was raised with reference to presidential, budgetary and other formal government comments and statements. e.g. South Africa has to balance conflict and governance issues between national priorities and regional/conflict priorities.

Against the backdrop of IDC and the Delegation of the EU-SA's workshop contributions, a range of conflict and governance sectoral themes emerged. Participant concerns, observations and perceptions, broadly related to the ODA dynamic within the conflict and governance sector are detailed hereafter.

- **Impact of political change on ODA policy-** With regard to long term policy impacts. A proviso being that potential 'Policy turbulence' due for instance, to political processes could affect decision-making on the direction of ODA reforms.
- **Efficacy of South Africa's leadership and ODA coordination:** It was noted that management capability in this regard has implications for domestic development and yet also SA's continental position. Countries including South Africa might lack the absorption capacity to disburse funds and countries might find donor processes more onerous. However, South Africa's continental and international prominence is also an opportunity to exert a positive influence and become a regional/continental role model.
- **Tri-lateral Relations:** South Africa is itself an emerging donor or is often used as a platform for programmes into Africa thus involving it in tri-lateral relations -Mr. Yaso (NT-IDC) indicated that a Trilateral Framework would be ready by mid 2007. Donor assistance is required and necessary consultations will be conducted. Participants observed however, that in the past, informal and unplanned policy interventions have been undertaken (emergency relief to Mozambique). Despite domestic necessities, continental problems like the Ivory Coast continue to receive government attention to the possible neglect of domestic issues? Do trilateral relations amount to a policy distraction? Despite a moral obligation to render assistance⁷, how do South Africa's SADC partners see its growing influence? Is South Africa's rising

⁷ As mentioned by Mr. Yaso (NT-IDC)

profile as a regional power perceived as a threat; and what are the ramifications for future relations with its neighbours?

- **Sustainable Development:** The South African government is overburdened by social demands from various sectors. This has led to an inability to address all issues, creating gaps in ameliorative support for needy sectors. It was however observed that South Africa did inherit high levels of structural poverty and inequality. Nevertheless, challenges to attaining the goal of sustainable development remain.
- **High Human Resource Mobility:** There is a high skills turnover within the South African public service. A dearth of qualified and experienced human resources means demand outstrips supply; exacerbated by the movement of labour to the better paying private sector. Discussants pointed to a lack of qualified human resources and weak institutional capacity to support for example, local level service delivery mechanisms and the optimum disbursements of any budget, let alone donor budget to reach those in need.
- **Civil Society Collaboration:** Better collaboration between NGOs will build enabling networks across the conflict and governance sector. Workshop presentations indicate that regional collaboration between strong NGOs exists.⁸By pooling resources, networks and NGO/CBO partnerships can exploit the value added by their combined and therefore enhanced competencies. However, CSOs work in a highly competitive arena for scarce resources.
- **CSO Access to ODA:** Post democracy donor funds, previously available to CSOs, have been diverted to Government. CS lacks its pre-democracy vibrancy; leading to the decline of some organisations due to a lack of funding. The question of whether or not government makes funds available to CSO's was posed and problematised.
- **Governance:** How can governance (public service transparency and accountability), be enhanced? This question indicates concerns with mechanisms for ensuring acceptable levels of 'good governance' in public resource management. This is offset by sometime onerous donor driven procedures that have to be used in addition to local procedures-thus complicating the system.

Human resource capability is critical to policy goal achievement, playing a central role in institutional activity. Capacity building in the sector attracted the following participant comments.

5.2 Capacity Building in the arena:

The follow points were reflected in discussion.

⁸ Both the Institute for Strategic Studies and the Olaf Palme International Centre engage in regional collaboration with NGOs.

- **Regional Institutional Capacity:** The EU has been trying to put in place capacity building for NEPAD (New Partnership Agreement for Africa's Development). However the project is constrained by a lack of absorptive capacity as a necessary foundation for project implementation. Available human and financial resource inputs from the AU are lacking. Given the intricacy of existing institutional relationships, how can donors work with AU/SADC/NEPAD more effectively?
- **Lack of human resource capacity;** in regional and sub-regional bodies (SADC/AU/NEPAD). Some donors have encountered programme implementation difficulties. However, one reason adduced is a dependence on staff secondments from member states. A second is the negative impact of member states varying financial capabilities; exemplified by an inability to supply qualified and adequately remunerated staff.

For example, the AU has staffing problems. Member States supply HR needs through secondments from their domestic institutions. Problems identified include poor quality staff and differences in remunerative rates. Some emoluments are paid at United Nations Development Programme Rates (UNDP). UNDP rates are high and by comparison unaffordable by some member states. Disparities in pay scales adversely affect staff motivation. Human resources deficiencies have resulted in a dependence on consultants⁹. How to overcome such constraints remains a challenge. How can HR deficiencies be resolved?

Further, in a departure from the human resource capacity building norm, the British government has shifted focus to support for systems (institutional processes). An instance is capacity building for the AU - Africa Peace Facility (including SADC).

- **Political differences;** can hamper support. The SADC Peace Training Centre in Harare, Zimbabwe is an example. British differences with Zimbabwe are a constraint to technical support delivery.

⁹ For e.g. SADC

6. Mapping of support within the conflict, security, peace-building and governance sector:

6.1 Workshop Presentations:

The following support initiatives were tabled in depth at the workshop¹⁰:

Intervention	Support Provided by:	Presenter:	Examples of Programmes
1. The Conflict and Governance Facility (Research Grant-Making Facility/ Capacity Building/Collaboration within conflict and governance arena)	A partnership project of National Treasury and the European Union Programme of Reconstruction and Development (EPRD)	Ms Charmaine Estment: Programme Co-ordinator	www.cage.org.za
2. South Africa-Netherlands Programme in Alternatives in Development-in a Declaration of Intent with CAGE (Research Grants to Higher Education and high level capacity building programme for emerging research capability)	The Government of the Netherlands through the Royal Netherlands Embassy in SA	Dr Anshu Padayachee	www.sanpad.org.za
3. Foundation for Human Rights: Human Rights Education; HR Campaigns, Celebrations and Events; Legal Services in support of HR; HR training and education	Partnership between South Africa and European Programme for Reconstruction and Development	Yasmin Sooka	www.fhr.org.za
4. International Development	South African Government	Mr. Luyando Yaso	www.dcis.gov.za

¹⁰ For further information around these programmes, contact the Embassy/programme concerned or e-mail info@cage.org.za

Cooperation Department (National Treasury) (Not a direct funder but provides information and co-ordination)	and EPRD		
3. Urban Conflict Management Programme (UCMP/PDP) (Programme amongst the Youth as Community Peace Workers)	German Technical Assistance (GTZ) Programme	Mr Ulrich Burgmer Project Manager/ Daniela Tunger	www.gtz.co.za
4. Southern African Conflict Advisor	UK Government	Mr. Jeremy Astill-Brown	Programme support at Regional and domestic level for Conflict and Governance
5. AusAid Africa Governance Facility managed by AusAID Pretoria	The Australian Government	Anita Menete	Trade Policy and Liberalisation Democracy and Governance Electoral processes and citizen participation Anit.menete@dfat.gov.au
6. Various Programmes supported by the government of Finland	The Government of Finland	Mr Pertti Anttinen	Promote governance and democracy in Southern Africa e.g. Community Peace Programme (CPP): Research on civilian protection in African Peacekeeping Missions (Institute for Security Studies – ISS)
7. Programmes supported by the Royal Netherlands Embassy-See SANPAD above	Government of the Netherlands	Mr. Menzi Hlongwa	AMIB – Burundi; Protection Force – Burundi www.dutchembassy.co.za
8. Umsobomvu Youth Fund –youth business initiatives, youth advice centres youth research	South African government and donor partners	Ms Veronica Mathebula	www.uyf.org.za

Olaf Palme International Centre: Democracy, Human Rights, Peace and Dialogue through direct project support, training, seminars etc- Africa and Regional offices in Western Balkans, Palestine, South Africa and Philippines	Swedish funding	Ms Thoke Matshe	
Embassy of France in South Africa Small scale funding	French Government	Jean-Phillipe Dufour	Contact French Embassy in South Africa

6.2 Programmes as per Documentation/Interviews:

See Annex 2 for full list of participants to source other organisations in donor/ODA Sector

Programmes	Supported By:	Contacts	Examples of Programmes
1. European Union Programmes for Reconstruction and Development	European Union	European Union Annual Report 2004 www.eusa.org.za	Legislative Support Programme CWCI Local Economic Development Assistance to Policing in Eastern Cape e-justice etc
2. Polish Development Cooperation	Government of Poland	Mr. Marek Kijewski economicamb@mweb.co.za	Polish Aid Annual Report 2005 www.polskapomoc.gov.pl
3. Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)	Government of Switzerland	Annamarie Minder (Country Director)	Centre for Social Accountability (Rhodes University); Governance monitoring tools (IDASA) www.sdc.org.za
4. Irish Aid	Government of Ireland	Pat.Curran@dfa.ie	Citizenship Leadership for Democratic Governance
Southern Africa Trust	DFID	Neville Gabriel www.southernafricatrust.org	Grant Making and other related funding activities for regional poverty initiatives

7. Analysis of Information:

The analysis of information covers donor activity and implementation within the conflict and governance arena. This is partly captured in the updated ODA matrix that follows this section. Whilst donor focal areas broadly coincide with the MTEF, the updated donor matrix exhibits diverse sectoral areas of interest. Operational areas are not much different from the 2005 ODA matrix. The ODA matrix reflects bilateral and multilateral agreements and shows that areas of intervention depend on individual donor interests; with South Africa playing a coordinating role. Information compiled in the 2006 matrix attempts to deepen ODA analysis by including data on programme objectives, target groups, previous results, funding allocations and channels of implementation amongst others. Analysis highlights include drawbacks affecting implementation of domestic, sub-regional and regional initiatives. The intention is to provide further utility to actors in the conflict and governance arena and promote donor introspection on achieving optimum ODA utility. An important point of departure is to identify problem areas affecting ODA.

Support ranges from providing financial and technical resources, to direct implementation e.g. GTZ¹¹. For the bigger donors, linkages can be identified with a more global or regional approach that both transcends and informs their individual country initiatives¹². The methods employed may differ across the spectrum of beneficiaries. However, where the recipient state has an existing MTEF, sectoral choices may align with a broader donor strategy. Support is also applied through intermediaries and programmes they run; in part facilitating a 'trickle down' effect. The conflict and governance sector is therefore a function of the broader development oriented framework. Nevertheless, are there mechanisms for facilitating programme linkage so as to benefit from latent inter-programmatic synergies? How sustainable are current initiatives?

Issues tabled by workshop participants point to a need for deeper introspection on underlying stumbling blocks to achieving optimum ODA results and thereby, sustainability. Focal issues are conflict oriented and related to initiatives directed at sub-regional and regional organisations. Highlights of the problem orientation also show strategic concerns (e.g. EU *ibid.*) with an appropriate interpretation by- and links with the domestic context; and the necessary absorptive capacity of domestic and regional institutions to benefit from ODA inflows. Similarly, the ODA workshop process also revealed participant observations across a broad spectrum. Observations focussed on challenges to sustainable development; covering institutional capabilities, governance, political influence, bi and trilateral relations, human resource capacities and human security.

Problems identified focus on key domestic, regional and sub-regional intervention dilemmas. Suggestive, are continued obstacles to project implementation at regional and sub-regional levels such as; human resource and staffing inputs from AU/NEPAD/SADC member states. Thematic areas

¹¹ See donor matrix

¹² EU Country Strategy Paper and Multi-annual Indicative Programme (CSP/MIP)

comprise democracy and human rights, good governance, urban conflict, trade, peace and security. Given an overarching focus on peace and security, regional and sub-regional initiatives are centred on conflict related factors. The importance of conflict at the regional level is borne out by a donor focus on peace and security; also reflected are questions on the efficacy of South Africa's bilateral and trilateral framework (*ibid.*).

On the other hand, the ODA matrix shows that human security (domestic) is defined by a donor focus on vulnerable groups (rural poor, children, women, youths and the disabled) and conflict prone communities on the one hand; and for instance, trade, water, education and climate change on the other. Support initiatives also encompass government, civil society; the academia and private sector. Challenges identified are founded on the means by which these issues are addressed. The common factor being that donor support, via ODA recipients is targeted in such a way as to make up for social and institutional weaknesses. One challenge is how to improve the strategic focus of ODA support to promote sustainable development. A second is rationalising support to regional and sub-regional institutions and deepening institutional relationships with member states.

Beneficiaries are unable to overcome specific problems on their own; hence the need for assistance. However, if institutional (domestic and regional) capacities do not exhibit a universal improvement, donor support will be a continuous requirement. On the other hand, the quantum of socio-economic and other demands made on government and its agencies implies a need for long term support; to address policy priorities. On the subject of priorities, in a hierarchy of needs, whose requirements come first; as between, governments, and donors? In this milieu where does the citizen fit in and what leverage will redirect resources to address grassroots anxieties for instance? The purpose here is not to criticise but to highlight the element of donor choice and ownership by beneficiaries' vis-à-vis problem definition and the resolution of institutional related shortcomings.

In this regard ODA inflows provide a necessary support system and assist countries like South Africa to address socio-economic development obstacles within a budgetary framework recognised and accepted by the donor community. Does the expected value added by the ODA mechanism translate into improved capabilities across the board; and manifest in positive system wide impacts?

It is beyond the purview of this report to conduct a capability review or an impact analysis. However, workshop discussions and the donor matrix imply the following.

Donor support (ODA inflows) and efficacy required to achieve sustainable impact is much dependent upon optimum utility of resources provided. However, at the bilateral and multi-lateral levels there is only so much ODA can achieve, independent of institutional policy and capability attributes relative to key domestic and regional actors in the conflict and governance

arena. What then is the way forward? In this regard, recommendations for improving the strategic focus and ODA 'take up' are detailed below.

8. Towards a Way Forward: Conclusions and Recommendations:

The foregoing Analysis of Information provides the backdrop to this section. Points raised emphasise perceived difficulties to optimum ODA. Put another way, these are key areas that donors may wish to explore to improve the value added by partnering with South Africa and investing in Southern Africa's development.

The strategy behind ODA inflows could do with further examination. This goes beyond the conflict and governance sector with consequences for realizing South Africa's economic development goals; and influencing sub-regional and regional outcomes. Whilst the MTEF is South Africa's blue print for economic development, mechanisms for improved institutional absorptive capacity and optimum resource application necessitate carefully directed responses. Consequently, in developing a future strategy, ODA partners may wish to bear in mind subsequent considerations.

- **Donor Interrelations and Comparative Advantage:** Coordination between donors on areas of comparative advantage should be further investigated, vis-à-vis donor interests and South Africa's MTEF/ODA policy. Understandably different donor groups exist (e.g. EU; the United States; United Nations; World Bank etc.). However, a unity of purpose is provided by membership of complimentary regional and multi-lateral organisations with similar strategic goals (e.g. Millennium Development Goals – MDG's). Whilst there is a common ground under the aegis of groups such as the G8 and ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) for instance – in which the EU, South Africa and other donors play a part, country level dynamics may not exhibit similar congruence. Therefore information exchanges between donor 'blocs' requires operational level interactions. Whilst this may be simplistic at face value, the long term prognosis for optimising ODA inflows makes it worthy of consideration.

Given the foregoing, the difficulty is in coordinating inflows and improving links between available capacity and programme implementation needs. To achieve this donor inputs require greater synergies in allocating areas of support (amongst donors). This will aid coordination with the South African government and present a more holistic approach to interrogating sectoral problems. By the same token, South Africa, in negotiating areas of support it requires should develop its coordinating capabilities; and improving the quality and accuracy of policy inputs vis-à-vis its ODA framework.

- **Improved Targeting:** Donors can improve their programme targeting by coordinating with government and agreeing on a mechanism for providing sector wide audits and evaluations to produce periodic data

on sectoral programme implementation and actors at all levels¹³. Key indicators (qualitative and quantitative), to be developed should highlight governance related factors (accountability, efficiency and effectiveness); and structural and institutional capabilities. Due attention should be taken of disadvantaged groups and conflict prone communities. This will benefit future joint planning exercises in the long term; and provide short-term data for remedial measures to address drawbacks in current sectoral implementation activity.

- **Human and State security:** Donor influence on Human and State security: Both areas are considered as key to the contextual understanding of 'security' and reflect concerns of all actors; governments, donors and society. Important are different conceptual frameworks of analysis for understanding and addressing seemingly competing interests (e.g. between domestic and external relations). However regional capacity building requires a practical approach to enhance capability at the level of the AU and SADC. The incorporation of an approach that promotes sustainable post conflict development at the regional level (AU) must interrogate governance issues that exacerbate conflict in the domestic policies of member states. To address lapses, focussed research, training, capacity building, policy, formulation, and implementation is needed. A major challenge being how to put this into practice at sub-regional and regional levels.
- **Good Governance:** Donors must influence studies to identify locally workable definitions for 'good governance'. Governance is a lynchpin of ODA management. Within the implementation context, the level of understanding and therefore acceptance of 'governance' as a stand alone concept demands further investigation. This is a stepping stone to improving the capacity of public servants and beneficiaries, to accept and ensure rights, duties and expectations are understood by all parties in implementation processes.

Understanding how 'governance' translates into local practice to ensure systems are accountable can only add value to interventions. A caveat however, is how to promote a more endogenous (home grown) formula for instituting governance processes as an alternative to superimposing a 'value system' that may not correspond to local realities and understanding. A means of addressing this is to involve core actors and beneficiaries in the process of interrogating this.

- **ODA Impact Assessments:** Impact assessments of past and current ODA inflows. Baseline data on the impact of ODA will allow for programme realignment and more accurate targeting. Also useful are performance indicators as a yardstick for checks against implementation milestones. Most important is information on appropriate mechanisms for aid delivery.

¹³ This is also applicable to sub-regional interventions.

- **Mainstreaming Civil Society:** Donor funding whilst necessary should commit to promoting sustainability. Recipients and beneficiaries must achieve the ability to stand alone. This is critical for long term development, especially relation to civil society organisations. Given that informal community based organisations (CBOs) play an important grassroots role, their lack of absorptive capacity militates against access to ODA and mainstream involvement in development activity. Cooperation or twinning with formal civil society organisations (CSOs) will build networks of organisations with improved overall capacity for resource management and service delivery. A key prerequisite is a mechanism for demand driven policy research to better align policy formulation with problem definition and analysis. At both regional and domestic level, evolving a demand driven policy framework has implications for public sector leadership capabilities¹⁴.

Donors must therefore promote the realignment of research as specific project related inputs to influence accurate policy formulation. To achieve this, government institutions (policy makers) must encourage civil society (CS) participation in human security policy formulation. This includes introducing mechanisms for building practical relationships that bring needy communities, their service providers¹⁵ and researchers together in a sub-system within a broader policy formulation framework. One remit for research bodies lies in redirecting conflict and governance initiatives towards more in-depth investigations of human security issues. In turn, the research function serves to bridge identified gaps between the problem context (including all stakeholders¹⁶) and policy-making processes.

- **Improving ODA ‘Take Up’ Within Civil Society:** A realistic appraisal of existing institutional capacities and measures¹⁷ instituted to redress skills and other deficiencies has potential for improving service delivery. A related question is how can CSO capabilities be enhanced so as to benefit from direct budgetary? The CAGE ODA assessment identifies inadequate skilled human resources and the need for continuous capacity building within the public and non-governmental sectors. In this regard focal areas of community level initiatives can be incorporated into policy implementation frameworks and with appropriate technical support enrich the process. In further support of this approach is the concept of ‘twinning’ (*op.cit.*) between research institutions and community based organisations (CBOs). The purpose is to provide technical and management skills and support systems to weaker institutions by well established CSOs. For instance, this will present further opportunity for obtaining feedback via monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of service delivery and governance issues at the level

¹⁴ Southern African Regional Conflict Advisor presentation identified human resource gaps within SADC and the AU; governance issues linked to poor service delivery and resulting in community level protests.

¹⁵ Relevant organs in the hierarchies at Regional, National, Provincial, Municipal and community levels

¹⁶ Primary, secondary and external stakeholders

¹⁷ Human resource improvement plans: including training, re-training and secondments

of provincial and municipal governance, outside the normal public service process.

The CAGE mapping exercise has captured key issues and concerns affecting conflict and governance; as seen by actors in the sector. An important challenge however, remains one of influencing optimum ODA application. To promote this, weak linkages between policy choices, and service delivery needs¹⁸ can be interrogated by introducing a mechanism to promote improved links between policy formulation and implementation. This recognises that a policy framework exists¹⁹ alongside a research orientation as exemplified by institutions such as CAGE, research institutions and specialised university departments. Complementary to this is technical support provided by bilateral (e.g. European Union and foreign government representatives) and multilateral institutions (e.g. World Bank); in furtherance of the optimum application of ODA.

Carrying this process forward in a more holistic and strategic manner requires a rethink. By empowering institutions with a remit for aiding the efficacy of ODA, donors in partnership with the South African government will be better placed to promote sustainable socio-economic development.

¹⁸ Reference – Mbeki – 2005/2006 Budget speech

¹⁹ ODA Policy guidelines

9. 2006- Matrix of Support Initiatives around the conflict, governance, security and stability arena:							
Donor:	Embassy of Finland	EU	GTZ	DFID	Netherlands	Australia	Ireland
Name of Programme:	Local Cooperation Fund		Urban Conflict Management Programme (UCMP/PDP) : Programme amongst the Youth as Community Peace workers)	Governance, Peace and Security	MONUC . - Operation MICRON . - AMIB (Burundi) -Protection Force (Burundi)	AusAID Africa Governance Facility	Irish Aid South Africa Programme
Strategic Framework	Finnish Development policy guidelines			Under review- Likely SADC SIPO and complementary national capabilities; support for water, climate programmes (internally)		Implemented as part of the Australian aid programme's framework for Africa - 'Australia and Africa, Facing the Challenges as Partners 2003-07'	Good Governance/Human Rights/Democratisation Sector
Objectives of the Programme	Promote and to deepen democratic governance and human rights culture in South (ern) Africa. --			To be developed		To promote and support the advancement of good governance in targeted countries in southern and eastern Africa through: Strengthening transparent and accountable	Strengthen good governance, human rights and democratisation in South Africa

						democratic processes; --.	
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Donor:	Embassy of Finland	EU	GTZ	DFID	Netherlands	Australia	Ireland
Target Groups	Civil Society organisations, vulnerable groups i.e. poor, rural areas, children, women, disabled, youth.			Currently working on Africa conflict prevention pool with Her Majesty's Government		Government, civil society, academia and private sector	
Results/ Activities	Examples: 2006: Establishing and supporting peace committees in disadvantage areas -- CPP (Community Peace Programme).					Trade policy: SAIIA. -- Trade database analysis and data analysis: TIPS. -- Trade and investment law scholarships: Univ. of Pretoria and Western Cape. -- Trade law capacity building: TRALAC	
Funding Allocated	€3.4m - 2004. -- €4.5m - 2005. -- €3.5m - 2006. -- €1.0m - ACCORD (African civil military cooperation training programme			No funds allocated	MONUC - EUR294.310,80. - MICRON NLG2,000,000. - AMIB Burundi - EUR 1.000.000 (EUR7.000.000 paid). - Protection Force Burundi - NLG10.000.000.	A\$15m over five years from 2005	

Donor:	Embassy of Finland	EU	GTZ	DFID	Netherlands	Australia	Ireland
Regional Definition	Southern Africa (South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland).			As indicated in strategic framework		Southern & Eastern Africa	
Channels of Implementation							
Civil Society Organisations and Research Organisations	The Programme works with CSOs of RSA, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho; ca. 40 partner organisation presently.			None targeted yet; depends on development of strategic framework		The programme works with a number of South Africa NGOs and one Kenyan NGO to deliver the programme throughout southern and eastern Africa International IDEA	

10. Matrix of 2005 as per previous Report –replicated for ease of reference:

Draft Matrix of Support Initiatives from partners within the ODA and donor framework within the field of conflict, security, stability, governance and related fields of cross cutting support:												
PRIMARY FOCUS AREAS*												
Areas of Intervention with regard to conflict prevention/better governance		EU	EU	DCI	SDC	Government of Norway	Nether-Lands	GTZ	UNDP	DFID	CIDA	Netherlands
		(Cage)	Other				SANPA D					
Research		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Research into Conflict		Yes									Yes	
Research into: Governance/ Democracy/Civil society strengthening		Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	
Research into: Cross-Cutting Issues related to conflict prevention e.g. economic, social development, natural resources, culture and identity, poverty, gender, youth		Yes (Indirect)	Yes				Yes			Yes	Yes	
Dissemination of Research Findings Advocacy		Yes	Yes				Yes					

Programmes around Poverty					Yes				Yes	Yes	Yes	
Areas of Intervention with regard to conflict prevention/better governance		EU	EU	DCI	SDC	Norwegian Government	Netherlands	GTZ	UNDP	DFID	CIDA	Netherlands
Capacity Building General/ Civil Society/ Citizens		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Capacity Building around the building of Institutions		Yes (Research)	Yes					Yes			Yes	
Programmes around HIV and Aids as conflict prevention/Human Security			Yes	Yes			Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	
Natural Resources with regard to conflict prevention/management			Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes		Yes	
Election principles					Yes	Yes			Yes		Yes	
Strengthening Justice Human Rights			Yes		Yes						Yes	
Dept of Justice programme			Yes	Yes							Yes	
Support to Policing			Yes								Yes	
Support to Trade Unions (labour peace)			Yes									

Trauma –Related programmes			Yes	Yes								
Areas of Intervention with regard to conflict prevention/better governance		EU	EU	DCI	SDC	Nor. Emb.	Neth	GTZ	UNDP	DFID	CIDA	Netherlands
Mediation and Reconciliation.			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
AU/NEPAD support		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes	
Programmes around Democratization		Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	
Policy Framework/ Orientation		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes			Yes		Yes	
Programmes around conflict prevention			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Crime prevention			Yes	Yes				Yes			Yes	
Youth			Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	
Women			Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Advocacy programmes around conflict and governance			Yes					Yes	Yes		Yes	
Civil Society focus		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	
Corruption and Organised Crime			Yes			Yes			Yes		Yes	
Channels of Implementation:												
Inter Governmental Organisations (e.g SADC, ECOWAS)			Yes			Yes			Yes		Yes	
Multi-Laterals				Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes	
Parliament/			Yes								Yes	

Legislatures												
Civil Society Organisations		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes	
Areas of Intervention with regard to conflict prevention/better governance		EU	EU	DCI	SDC	Nor. Emb.	Neth	GTZ	UNDP	DFID	CIDA	Netherlands
Government/Multi-lateral to Government		Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes					Yes	
African or African Union focus		Yes	Yes								Yes	
SADC Focus		Yes	Yes									
Modalities of Programmes												
Technical Assistance			Yes						Yes	Yes	Yes	
Programme/Project Management Units		Yes	Yes								Yes	
MONUC												Yes
Operation Micron												Yes
AMIB Burundi												Yes
Protection For Burundi												Yes
GAPS in SUPPORT:												
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stringent and well informed conflict prevention activities • Long Term and Sustainable Support • Support for Robust Developmental Peace Keeping which entails intense investment and longer lead times • Support in terms of building economic drivers beyond the war economy • Support for transitional justice systems (including Amnesty, Reconciliation el. al)and setting up of functional criminal justice systems • Support for Prosecutions against Impunity around War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity and Human Rights abuses, Gender crimes within conflict • Building education, employment and trade in post conflict societies 												

- Empowerment of women in post conflict societies
- Poverty Reduction/Alleviation
- Micro level support to local governance structures, individuals
- Innovation and entrepreneurship for post conflict reconstruction
- Post conflict modeling, scenario building/planning
- Interventions around the African Union Constitutive Act with regard to “interference in internal affairs” under the prescribed conditions
- African Union Peace and Security Protocols in terms of implementation of these
- Generative Learning approaches (approaches about creating) beyond adaptive approaches (approaches about coping)
- Building capacity around a strong regional approach towards conflict and governance solutions
- Addressing corruption and corporate governance
- Citizenship/ nation building/ reconstruction of national identities/patriotism

*** : The Matrix attempts to classify the programmes according to primary focus areas: there is an acknowledgement that cross cutting issues are also addressed as secondary focus areas.**

11. Annexure

Annex 1: List of Participants:

Contacts					
Response	Number	First Name	Last Name	Title	Company Name
Attending	1	Guy	Lamb	Mr.	Institute of Security Studies (ISS)
Attending	2	Jeremy	Astill-Brown	Mr	UK/DFID
Attending	3	Ivor	Sarakinsky	Mr	University of Witwatersrand
Attending	4	Jozet	Muller		EC Delegation
Attending	5	Daniella	Tunger	Ms.	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
Attending	6	Anita	Menete		Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID)
Attending	7	Perti	Anttinen	Mr.	Finish Embassy
Attending	8	Jean-Philippe	Dufour	Mr.	French Embassy
Attending	9	Thoko	Matshe	Ms	Olaf Palme International Centre
Attending	10	Charmaine	Estment	Ms	CAGE
Attending	11	Nathalie	Vereen	Ms	CAGE
Attending	12	Allie	Cassiem	Mr	Foundation for Human Rights
Attending	13	Luyanda	Yaso	Mr.	NT: IDC
Attending	14	Menzi	Hlongwa	Mr	Royal Netherlands Embassy
Attending	15	Veronica	Mathebula	Ms.	Umsobomvu Youth Fund

Annex 2: Invited Organisations
Company / Organisation

ISS

SANPAD

National Treasury

National Peace Accord Trust

National Treasury

Konrad Adenauer Foundation

NT: IDC

Centre for Public Participation

Foundation for Human Rights

Centre for Policy Studies

IDASA

The Presidency

HSRC

UNDP

Centre for Developmental Peacekeeping &

UNODC

UNDP

Department Foreign Affairs

Delegation of the EU-SA

National Treasury

Flemish Attache - Rep for Southern Africa

Malawi High Commission

Embassy of Cote d'ivoire

Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
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Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt

British Commission

Embassy of Angola

High Commission of the Republic of Namibia
Dutch Embassy
Embassy of Egypt
British High Commission
Embassy of the United States of America
Development Specialist
International Development Co-operation
DFID
Centre for Development and Enterprise
Themba Lesizwe
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
The Presidency
Action Support Centre
SANPAD
Southern African Trust
Southern Africa Trust
Southern African Regional Poverty Network
Wits Migration Studies (CFP2)
GenderLinks
Action Aid International
The Presidency
The Presidency
Foreign Affairs
EC Delegation
NEDLAC Community Constituency
CCR – CT
UYF
UYF
CWCI
CSAP

FA
DPSA
NT
NT
The Presidency
GTZ
ACCORD
ACCORD
Frederich Ebert Stiftung
SaferAfrica
SaferAfrica
AWEPA
AWEPA
Australian High Commission
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID)
Austria
Belgium Embassy
Canadian High Commission
China Embassy
Danish Embassy
Finland Embassy
French Embassy
German Embassy
GTZ
Ireland Embassy
Italian Embassy
Japan Embassy
Japan International Cooperation
New Zealand High Commission
Norwegian Embassy

Spanish Embassy
Sweden Embassy
SIDA
Swiss Development Cooperation
Switzerland Embassy
United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland
USAID
US Embassy
European Investment Bank
French Development Bank
World Bank
DFID
Ireland
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Greece
Hungary
Poland
Portugal
Rumania
Spain
The Olaf Palme International Centre
Polish Ambassador
Belgium
Embassy Ireland
Ford Foundation